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Title: 
Critical upward feedback in organisations: 
Processes, problems and implications for communication management 
 
Abstract 
 
Given that staff-management relationships are a core concern for communication 
management, upward feedback is emerging as a key theme in the literature. However, it 
is most often associated with upward appraisal. This study looks at upward feedback in 
a more general sense, and in particular at whether such feedback is critical or positive 
in its response to senior management decisions. 146 staff within a health care 
organisation (HCO) were surveyed, using a depth-Communication Audit instrument. 15 
staff were also interviewed in detail, while 6 focus groups each composed of 6 people 
were also convened. Results indicated that informal upward feedback was mostly 
absent; that where it occurred the feedback was inaccurately positive; that senior 
managers were unaware of such distortions and unwilling to contemplate the possibility 
that they did indeed exist; that they had an exaggerated impression of how much 
upward feedback they received; and that they discouraged the transmission of critical 
feedback. Implications for the practice of communication management, the 
development of upward influence within organisations and general theoretical reasons 
for distortions in feedback processes are considered. 
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Introduction 
‘The temptation to tell a Chief in a great position the things he most likes to hear is one 
of the commonest explanations of mistaken policy. Thus the outlook of the leader on 
whose decision fateful events depend is usually far more sanguine than the brutal facts 
admit.’  
Winston Churchill (1931) 
 
Benefits of upward feedback 
In recent years, research into upward feedback in organisations has burgeoned (Atwater 
et al., 2000). One survey of 280 Midwest companies in the USA found that 25% used 
annual upward appraisals, 18% peer appraisals and 12% used 360-degree appraisals 
(DeNisi, 1996). Companies such as AT&T, the Bank of America, Caterpillar, GTE and 
General Electric have been pioneers with this latter approach (Hargie et al., 1999). 
Thus, upward feedback itself seems to most often occur as part of the appraisal process, 
rather than through daily information communication channels (Atwater et al., 1995).  
 
Accordingly, it has been argued that upward feedback, upward communication and 
open door policies deliver significant organisational benefits. These include: 
 
• The promotion of shared leadership, and an enhanced willingness by managers 
to act on employee suggestions (Moravec et al., 1993).  
• A greater tendency by employees to report positive changes in their managers’ 
behaviour (Hegarty, 1974).  
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• Actual rather than perceived improvements in management behaviour following 
from feedback, beyond what could be attributed to regression to the mean 
(Reilly et al., 1996).  
• A reduced gap between managers’ self-ratings and those of their subordinates 
(London and Wohlers, 1991). 
• The creation of improved forums for obtaining information, garnering 
suggestions, defusing conflict and facilitating the expression of discontent 
(Shenhar, 1990). 
 
These are critical issues for communications management. In particular, much of the 
literature on high performance work systems, most closely associated with the work of 
Pfeffer (1994; 1998) stresses the importance of openness between managers and staff, 
the central role of good communication systems and the need to tackle such problems 
as status differentials between those at the top and those at the bottom of organisations. 
However, significant problems have been reported with the delivery of upward 
feedback. Research suggests that feedback tends to mainly flow from persons in 
authority to their subordinates (Luthans and Larsen, 1986). Moreover, the limited 
upward feedback that occurs tends to be flawed in the sense that positive upward 
feedback is a more common occurrence than negative upward feedback (Baron, 1996). 
Baron’s study also suggests radically different perceptions between managers and their 
staff on this issue. The managers concerned perceived many more instances of negative 
feedback than their subordinates. However, both managers and subordinates perceived 
the same level of positive feedback. It thus appears that people are especially sensitive 
to negative input – what has been termed the automatic vigilance effect (Pratto and 
John, 1991). Intentionally or otherwise, it is therefore likely that their less than 
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enthusiastic response will discourage it. Thus, motivating truthful upward 
communication is widely recognised as a serious problem (Chow et al., 2000). 
 
Costs of not facilitating upward feedback 
Organisations that do not sufficiently utilise upward communication systems which 
includes positive and negative comments pay a considerable cost. In particular, it seems 
certain that the quality of decision-making by the top management team suffers, and 
this has a detrimental impact upon the whole organization. For example, Nutt (1999) 
studied 356 decisions in medium to large organizations. He concluded that half the 
decisions made within such organisations failed. Nutt’s analysis suggested that among 
the key factors explaining such failures were a tendency by managers to impose 
solutions, limit the search for alternatives, and use power rather than 
influence/persuasion to implement their plans. Successful decisions were more likely 
when managers made the need for action clear at the outset, set objectives, carried out 
an unrestricted search for solutions and got key people to participate. However, 
participation was used in just one of five decisions. Of course, effective participation 
systems both depend on and enhance upward feedback (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978; 
Krone, 1992; Stohl and Cheney, 2001).  
 
Such research is consistent with work conducted into what has been defined as 
groupthink (Janis, 1982). This has found that groups insulated from critical outside 
feedback develop illusions in their own invulnerability, excessive self confidence in the 
quality of their decision-making and an exaggerated sense of their distinctiveness from 
other groups. It follows that a group so inclined will also have a tendency to disparage 
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criticism from outside its own ranks, since it will conflict with the group’s ideal self-
image and depart from its well-entrenched norms.  
 
The absence of feedback may become a vicious cycle, in which poor decisions result; 
the group responds by belittling or denying the existence of crisis; feedback pointing to 
the crisis is disparaged as coming from tainted sources outside the magic circle of key 
decision makers; and those attempting to offer feedback respond by minimising much 
needed future critical feedback. In turn, this is likely to further reinforce the conviction 
of those at the top that (rogue indicators aside) things are actually much better than they 
are, and that the group does not require additional outside input.  
 
Problems of ingratiation 
One of the most potent explanations for difficulties with upward feedback can be found 
in ingratiation theory. This proposes that those with a lower level of status habitually 
exaggerate the extent to which they agree with the opinions and actions of higher status 
people, as a means of acquiring influence with them (Jones, 1990). Studies conducted 
with students in hypothetical situations indicate that decreased power among 
subordinates is accompanied by an increased tendency to employ some form of 
ingratiation (Michener et al., 1979) and an increased use of ‘politeness’ strategies 
(Baxter, 1984). The implications for the practice of management are considerable. For 
example, a culture of sycophancy has been identified as a key factor in the profits 
collapse that afflicted one of the UK’s best-known businesses, Marks & Spencer, in the 
late 1990s (Bevan, 2001). The company chairman’s direct reports have confessed that 
they actively avoided bringing bad news to his attention, fearing his wrath. However, as 
De Vries (2001: 94) has put it: ‘Effective organisational functioning demands that 
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people have a healthy disrespect for their boss, feel free to express emotions and 
opinions openly, and are comfortable engaging in banter and give and take.’  
 
Thus, particularly when contemplating dissent, employees consider whether it will 
result in retaliation, or whether it will be perceived as constructive (Kassing, 2001). 
Trust, or its absence, is therefore a key issue in determining the availability and efficacy 
of upward feedback. Without trust, such communication is limited. Moreover, the 
frequency and openness of inter-organisational communication is a vital precondition 
for the development of trust (Sydow, 1998) - a construct which is itself increasingly 
acknowledged as a positive contributor to business effectiveness (Sako, 1998; O'Brien, 
2001). It has been noted that ‘subordinates who do not trust their superior are willing to 
suppress unfavourable information even if they know that such information is useful for 
decision making’ (O’Reilly et al., 1987: 612). The result is yet more ingratiation 
behaviour, and a further weakening of critical upward feedback. 
 
In addition, self-efficacy biases suggest that most of us imagine we are better on 
various crucial dimensions of behaviour than we actually are (Myers, 1996). 
Accordingly, researchers have generally found that managers view the defective and 
uncritical feedback they receive from subordinates as accurate, sincere, and well meant 
(Rosenfeld et al., 1995) – it is in line with their self-efficacy biases. Since they are 
therefore inclined to think that the inaccurate and ingratiating feedback they receive 
daily is accurate, they grow even less inclined to seek mechanisms that institutionalise 
critical upward feedback into the decision-making process.  
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The effect is to distort both downward and upward communication processes. To deny 
fault and avert the possibility of blame, senior managers sometimes conceal negative 
organizational outcomes (Abrahamson and Park, 1994). People suppress information 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990), they cover up negative financial data (Whetton, 1980), 
they deny failure (Sutton and Callahan, 1987), and they have been shown to ‘launch 
propaganda campaigns that deny the existence of crises’ (Starbuck et al. 1978: 118). It 
has also been argued that the unidirectional nature of feedback systems in many 
organisations has been codified into much of the theory associated with 
transformational leadership (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). Clampitt (2001, p.17) 
summarises the problem as follows: ‘The law of gravity does not apply to information 
flow in organizations. Information held at the top of the organizational hierarchy (e.g. 
financial results, pending mergers etc.) does not always filter down. And some 
information, such as major success stories, held in the lower echelons show exceptional 
buoyancy in reaching the top, almost as if defying the laws of gravity. Effective 
managers know that the hierarchy inherently filters information… Sending the good 
news up is only natural for those who wish to get ahead in the organization.’ 
 
It appears that ‘…we are left with a paradox: the most successful leaders appear to be 
those who cultivate the least compliant followers, for when leaders err – and they 
always do – the leader with compliant followers will fail’ (Grint, 2000, p.420). Clearly, 
followers who are less compliant are more likely to deliver upward and critical 
feedback. Unfortunately, managers oblivious to the workings of ingratiation dynamics 
may be more likely to fire such recalcitrants than they are to encourage them. 
 
Research questions 
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Based on the above literature review, three major research questions were formulated 
as follows: 
 
1.  We wished to explore the extent to which people enacting different roles within the 
organisation felt they communicated information in an upward direction. Previous 
research has found a widespread assumption amongst many staff that senior managers 
are more informed about key change issues than such managers feel themselves to be 
(Hargie and Tourish, 1996). Building on this, we wished to explore here how much 
information different levels of the organisation, including managers, actually sent 
rather than received. It is reasonable to assume that key professional groupings within 
the health sector, such as doctors, would be regularly transmitting information. 
However, in an organisation bereft of robust upward communication devices such an 
expectation may well not be likely to be fulfilled.   
 
2.  We wished to explore gaps in perception on the part of managers and staff on the 
extent to which upward communication was welcomed and facilitated. Our working 
assumption was that senior managers would be more likely than junior staff to 
imagine that upward feedback was a regular feature of organisational life. However, 
overt discouragement is unlikely. Thus: do senior managers believe that upward 
communication is a regular feature of organisational life? If so, and this conflicts with 
reality, how, precisely, do senior managers either facilitate or obstruct upward 
feedback? What rationales, practices and stories help them to make sense of and 
hence reinforce these practices? 
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3.  A further research question was suggested by the observation that there is always a 
gap between ideal and actual practice (Hargie et al., 2002). For this reason, 
communication audit studies have invariably disclosed a gap between such 
dimensions of communication behaviour as how much information people currently 
get and what they ideally would like. We assumed in advance that this HCO 
(healthcare organisation) would be no different, and that, at a minimum, modestly 
critical findings would have to be presented to the organisation’s senior management 
team. The research question here is their reaction to such feedback and what it might 
imply for wider organisational functioning. 
 
Methodology 
Organisational communication research has been dominated by three major 
paradigms – interpretative, positivist and critical, with postmodernist approaches now 
also gaining increasing ground (Corman, 2000). Although it has been argued that such 
paradigms are incommensurate with each other, researchers are increasingly looking 
for common ground, in the hope that an overlap of perspectives and methods is 
permitted (or even required) to answer particular problems (see contributors to 
Corman and Poole, 2000). Such approaches seek to step beyond what has often 
become a sterile debate between qualitative and quantitative methodologies, in which 
protagonists frequently assert that only their preferred orientation sheds light on 
complex social phenomenon (see Cooper and Stevenson, 1998; Morgan, 1998). This 
paper is rooted in approaches that seek what has been described as ‘crossing’ rather 
than incommensurability between paradigms (Schultz and Hatch, 1996).  
 
Multiple methods of data collection are therefore utilised. As the story of their use 
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unfolds we position data and analysis alongside each other, to present a coherent 
narrative of internal communication processes concerned with critical feedback. For 
example, utilising this approach, we report management reactions to the issues raised 
as we outline the procedures that were utilised for the study, since this represents an 
early form of data and in turn helped shape subsequent lines of inquiry. 
 
The Organisational Context 
Data were collected from staff at a major European HCO undergoing significant 
internal reorganisation. The HCO employs 3500 staff, has a budget of over 300m 
Euros per annum, and offers a wide range of services to a population of 350,000 
people dispersed across a large geographical area. Internally, its structure could be 
characterised as a form of matrix structure (Mintzberg, 1983), in which unity of 
command has been sacrificed in an effort to compel greater interpersonal 
communication and shared decision-making among top managers – See Figure 1. It 
should be appreciated that the organisation’s structure is too complex to be reduced to 
one Figure, and that the version here is a much-simplified version of the reality. Thus, 
the HCO is composed of 7 main care groups (including acute illness, primary care and 
mental health), in four main geographical areas. (We have indicated only four care 
groups in Figure 1, for reasons of space). Within each group, a General Manager 
(GM), all male, had been appointed in the previous eighteen months, charged with the 
task of co-ordinating activities across the care groups within the locality. Thus, the 
essential point of the management structure was to be that clinical governance 
responsibilities lay with the care group director across all locations, ensuring 
consistent patterns of care. However, service co-ordination would be the 
responsibility of general managers within each locality, who were accountable to the 
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senior management team. This was an extraordinarily small body, composed only of 
the CEO and the seven care group Directors. Unusually, the finance director, human 
resources director and director of public health were not regularly invited to meetings. 
The Figure illustrates how this was meant to work with special emphasis on Area 1. 
Thus, each care group simultaneously reported to the GM, plus its own care group 
director (who had responsibilities across all major areas). Meanwhile, the GM had to 
co-ordinate the activities of seven care groupings in his area, while simultaneously 
dealing with seven care group directors - each of whom also directly interacted with 
the care group managers and subunits in the areas. Responsibility was thus highly 
diffused.  
 
The Sample and Procedures 
A Communication Audit was carried out in the HCO. This has been defined as ‘…a 
comprehensive and thorough study of communication philosophy, concepts, structure, 
flow and practice within an organisation’ (Emmanuel, 1986, p.50). As preparation for 
this Audit a meeting was held, between the authors and the HCO’s Senior 
Management Team. In line with normal practice (Hargie et al., 2002) this reviewed 
the general principles of Communication Audits and the likely timescale for the 
implementation of a Communication Audit within the organisation. Audit materials 
were distributed to a randomly selected, stratified, cross section of staff. Respondents 
had been invited to attend a variety of venues within the HCO during this time, where 
the materials could be completed under supervision. During this period, a total of six 
focus groups, attended by 23 people, and fifteen interviews were also conducted.  
These involved a broad range of randomly selected staff within the HCO, including a 
number of General Managers and members of the Senior Management Team.  
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The Sample 
146 respondents eventually completed the Questionnaire, approximately 3.3% of all 
staff within the HCO. Respondents were randomly elected from a computer print out 
listing all employees, their professional designation, managerial rank and work 
location. They were selected utilising a sampling frame proposed by Hargie and 
Tourish (1993), and which has proven sufficient to yield valid and reliable numbers in 
exercises of this kind. Respondents were written to by the CEO, while line managers 
were requested to make those concerned available at the designated times and 
locations when the survey was due to take place. Two follow up letters were 
dispatched, to secure increased participation rates. The final total was composed of 43 
staff from management and administration, 7 from medical and dental, 54 from 
nursing, 17 from paramedical, 20 from non-nursing support and 5 from technical and 
maintenance. Respondents also came from all the main locations with the HCO: 102 
from Area 1, 25 from Area 2, 15 from Area 3, and 5 from Area 4. The sample also 
included 18 middle managers and senior managers, 31 first-line managers, and 94 
without supervisory responsibilities. The majority of the respondents (some 81%) 
worked for the HCO full-time. The sample was also comprised of 111 females and 35 
males. Confidentiality was repeatedly assured, in initial contact letters and when the 
data was being collected. The eventual report was written in such a manner that 
individual respondents could not be identified. 
 
Measures 
The Questionnaire survey consisted of an instrument designed to measure general 
communication processes. This was adapted from a Communication Audit survey 
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developed by the International Communication Association during the 1970s 
(Goldhaber and Rogers, 1979), and widely regarded as a breakthrough instrument in 
the field (Clampitt, 2000). It was subsequently developed with special application in 
the healthcare sector by Hargie and Tourish (2000). The instrument consists of 77 
items clustered in nine factors, including measures for information received, sources 
from which information is received, channels through which it is received, 
information sent, and the quality of working relationships. The questionnaire also has 
a number of open questions, including a critical incident sheet, asking respondents to 
record examples of a communication episode which for them most summed up 
communication in the organisation concerned. Some doubts have been expressed 
about the validity of this tool and the usefulness of the difference scores that it 
produces (e.g. DeWine et al., 1985). Later revisions of it have attempted to resolve 
these problems (e.g. DeWine and James, 1988). However, it is generally accepted that 
‘this instrument is one of the boldest and most comprehensive attempts to measure all 
aspects of an organisation’s communication system’ (Clampitt, 2000, p.50). 
 
Data from the interviews and focus groups was content-analysed for main themes. 
Consistent with much current practice, both focus groups and interviews were 
conducted in the light of a priori thematizing (Lee, 1999), in which reference is made to 
existing theory, literature and the researcher’s insights. Thus, questions were 
constructed based on the project research questions. Comments from respondents were 
then content analysed around the main themes, as determined by frequency counts of 
the main comments received. Content analysis involved following protocols 
recommended by Clampitt (2000), in which: 
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• One researcher read all the responses to a given question and identified 
recurring themes. For example, we already had a theme of upward 
communication. Responses relating to these issues were initially divided into 
positive and negative categories. Further sub-divisions then emerged, depending 
on whether the experiences related to middle or senior managers, co-workers, 
channels of communication etc. 
 
• A second researcher, unaware of the classification system employed by the first 
researcher, repeated these steps. 
 
• Results were then compared and discussion ensued until an agreed classification 
system emerged. 
 
• The process was repeated twice, until agreement on coding that covered over 
90% of the responses was obtained.  
 
Results, outcomes and resistance points 
The data in Table 1 reinforces the conclusion that mechanisms for ensuring adequate 
upward communication within the HCO were indeed weak. Overall mean scores for 
the amount of information sent and needed to be sent on important issues were 2.8 
and 4.0 respectively. The difference between the scores for information sent and those 
that indicated the amount of information that people wished to send was statistically 
significant for all items. Again, this is evidence to suggest that mechanisms to ensure 
consultation, involvement and participation needed strengthening. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Clearly, there is more to feedback than sending information. However, we view 
‘information sent’ as useful general proxy for this issue. During the research project, 
we expressed this interpretation to participants before they filled in our 
questionnaires, to further ensure that we gained responses consistent with what we 
were seeking to measure.  
 
The most serious problems appeared to be with sending information on: 
• Public confidence and trust in the service 
• Funding for services, and  
• Service equity  
Cross-tabulations between these data and background factors found significant 
relationships between satisfaction with information sent and supervisory 
responsibilities, care group and occupational grouping. To take these in turn: 
 
• First-line managers had the greatest desire to send more information (4.2, 
compared to 3.8 for those without supervisory responsibilities, and 3.9 for 
middle and senior managers). This suggests that a crucial decision-making 
layer within the HCO felt more excluded from involvement and consultation 
than anyone else. It is particularly striking that this significant difference 
emerged in relation to important issues of general strategic importance. It 
suggests that ownership of such issues was not widely shared among even 
fairly senior people, in the sense of them feeling genuinely empowered to 
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influence decision making, act to solve problems and communicate about what 
was going on. 
 
• Staff in the acute hospital service, services for older people and mental health 
services were significantly less likely to be sending information than those in 
other care groups, all with scores of 2.6 for the amount of information they 
now sent. Thus, staff in these areas again felt less involved than those 
elsewhere. 
 
• Finally job category emerged as a significant factor. Paramedical staff and 
management/administrative staff felt themselves to be sending less 
information than other staff groups, with scores of 2.3 and 2.6 respectively for 
the amount of information they sent. The latter staff group, in particular, 
included many people in corporate services working in the organisation’s 
headquarters building, in close proximity to the SMT. They were therefore in a 
pivotal position, and crucial to the overall communication and cultural climate 
within the HCO. 
 
Respondent comments from focus groups and interviews 
• When people were asked, during interviews and in focus groups, to give their 
overall impressions of communication within the HCO a few responded 
positively. Examples were given of approachable line managers and an 
adequate flow of information on key issues, from these managers. A 
significant number of people, even when critical, felt that a genuine effort was 
being made to improve communication. However, positive comments about 
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the current situation were extremely rare. Most people, at all levels of the 
organisation, felt that the HCO’s internal communications were in a very poor 
state (Box 1). Much of this feeling revolved around the need for more 
communication. It is particularly noticeable that a disproportionate number of 
such comments related to the CEO, suggesting that the holder of this office 
tends to be perceived as setting the tone on this issue, as on most others (Box 
2). Nor were negative perceptions confined to the issue of information being 
transmitted from managers. A number of respondents, across the spectrum of 
staff groupings, locations and level of managerial responsibility felt that 
bottom up communication needed further development within the HCO.  
 
INSERT BOX 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Senior managers’ attitude towards critical feedback 
1. Reactions at introductory seminar 
As discussed above, a seminar was held for members of the SMT, looking at key 
issues likely to be raised during Communication Audit exercise. Given the focus of 
this study, special attention was paid to outlining problems with upward feedback and 
the key principles of ingratiation theory. Interestingly, all members of the SMT 
commented on the importance of upward communication, the direct relevance of 
ingratiation theory, their absolute determination to avoid it within their own 
organisation, and their conviction that people felt free to openly express their opinions 
to senior managers.  
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At this meeting, and in subsequent interviews held with each member of the SMT, a 
further key theme emerged in their discourse. This was that the major problem in their 
organisation was one of ‘competence’ on the part of the General Managers located 
immediately below them in the organisational hierarchy. Repeatedly, members of the 
SMT asserted that the GMs were ‘not up to the job’; ‘not doing their job’, ‘refusing to 
make decisions’, ‘failing to transmit information either up or down’, and ‘not co-
ordinating services in the manner now needed.’ The possibility that the job could have 
been inherently impossible was never expressed at this level. However, it emerged 
routinely in interviews with people at other levels of the organisation. Typically, those 
immediately below the GMs shuddered at the possibility of doing the job, describing 
it as ‘impossible’, ‘terrible’, ‘a nightmare’, and said they felt (as one interviewee put 
it) ‘completely unclear as to what they are supposed to do, and how they are supposed 
to do it.’  A senior administrative person said: ‘Would I take on a General Manager’s 
job in this organisation? You must be mad. In fact they must be mad to try it.’ Here, 
also, members of the SMT seemed to hold diametrically opposed views to those of the 
rest of their staff, including people who were in key positions and therefore essential 
to the achievement of the SMT’s key operating and strategic objectives. 
 
During subsequent interviews and in focus groups, unprompted by the research team, 
the expression ‘control freak’ recurred again and again when people discussed the 
SMT. This was particularly noticeable in interviews with administrative staff in 
support functions located within corporate services that worked in close liaison with 
the SMT. In essence, there was a huge gulf between how senior managers viewed 
themselves, on the question of their openness to feedback, and how they were viewed 
elsewhere – even by staff who had the closest working relationship with them.  
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2. Reactions at feedback seminar 
A detailed written report was prepared for the SMT, outlining some of the findings 
indicated above. Thus, the results had been circulated amongst the SMT, and were also 
discussed on an individual basis with several key people. In particular, this was 
distilled into ten major findings and associated recommendations. These looked at the 
major strengths revealed by the quantitative data; aspects of communication where 
action was required; results from focus groups and interviews; and results from the 
qualitative section of the main questionnaire. A short table, utilising basic descriptive 
statistics, summarised the main quantitative findings. These points were then verbally 
presented in an interactive workshop, in which the intended focus was how the SMT 
could respond to both the opportunities and problems that had been identified. How did 
they react to this challenge? 
 
Three responses predominated. The first was a universal refusal to accept that the data 
in any way represented the actual mood of people within the HCO. Interestingly, this 
view was based on the erroneous assumption that larger populations required ever 
higher rather than lower sample sizes to generate valid data. The SMT was so 
convinced of this that it showed the report to a statistician, who confirmed that the 
sample size was indeed sufficient and the data looked robust. In a further interesting 
demonstration of eliminating feedback inconsistent to what is preferred, his assurances 
were disregarded. Typical questions raised (and constantly reiterated) are cited in Box 
3.  
 
INSERT BOX 3 ABOUT HERE 
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Other researchers have reported similar difficulties, although perhaps not in such a 
sharp form. As Quirke (1996, p.203) comments: 
‘It is remarkable how… senior managers suddenly become experts in research 
methodology, asking questions about statistical validity, phrasing of questions in the 
questionnaire, individuals selected for interview, five-point scales and false positives. 
Resistance to uncomfortable findings is expressed in questions about the way the 
research has bee conducted. The findings are then talked out of court without any real 
discussion or acceptance of their validity, and hope of commitment to action 
disappears.’ 
 
The reaction reported here was an extreme case of precisely this phenomenon. A 
dominant mood seemed to be one of intense fear at the twofold possibility of admitting 
to their staff that problems existed with internal communication, and that such a 
dialogue might find itself into the wider public domain. The point was made that the 
data presented summed up the mood of the organization’s employees, who were 
therefore unlikely to be surprised by any of it. Moreover, research has found that 
managers who are seen to seek out negative feedback on their performance find their 
stature increasing, while those who seek only positive feedback find it declining 
(Ashford and Tsui, 1991). Such input failed to overcome the SMT’s inbuilt resistance 
to acknowledging that people genuinely felt as they did, and to then engage in a 
dialogue with them about the difficulties concerned. 
 
Secondly, the response of the SMT suggests that senior managers may have a tendency 
to subject critical feedback to intense scrutiny, demanding that it meets standards of 
evidence and proof that they rarely require from positive feedback. It is questionable, 
for example, whether the research team would have faced the same barrage of questions 
about their research methodology had the data presented a glowing picture of internal 
communications. Thus, any positive comments about communication (such as a finding 
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that ground level staff had high levels of trust in their immediate managers) were 
nodded through without discussion. In effect, the data was simultaneously regarded as 
prescient - and fatally flawed. The effect of this approach is inevitably to discourage 
and eventually eliminate critical feedback, while ensuring that more and more positive 
feedback finds its way into the deliberations of the SMT. In this way, it is possible for 
senior managers to acquire an extremely lop-sided view of their own organisation, 
while being unaware of the dynamics that produce it, and hence feeling all the more 
certain that their image of its internal functioning is accurate. We would describe this 
process as one of unconscious feedback distortion. 
 
Thirdly, there was a tendency to reinterpret negative feedback as positive. For example, 
the SMT was told of the large number of people who had described them as ‘control 
freaks.’ To general approval, one of them immediately responded: ‘I see that as a 
compliment. All it means is that we have high performance standards, and that is being 
recognised.’ 
 
Outside the feedback forum, evidence also emerged of internal tensions, masked by the 
tendency of people in a group to publicly over-conform to its emerging norms (Brown, 
2000). Thus a new member of the SMT who had earlier indicated that she viewed her 
new colleagues as ‘a bunch of control freaks’ approached the research team to say she 
had disagreed with the tone and approach of these colleagues in the face of the report. 
However, during the meeting in which they were present, she was unwilling to do other 
than echo the dominant view being expressed – sometimes as stridently as her 
colleagues. It is of course likely that this further added to the spectacle of people 
agreeing whole-heartedly with each other, and therefore strengthened the illusion of 
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participants that their approach made sense – a process that has been termed consensual 
validation (Zebrowitz, 1990). 
 
The group’s eventual decision was to suppress the report and take no further action on 
its contents. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A number of main themes stand out in the case study discussed here. In line with our 
research questions, these are as follows: 
 
 
1. This paper reveals fundamental problems with open communication, and 
illuminates some of the mechanisms whereby it is obstructed - key issues 
raised in our first and third research questions. The issues raised are 
fundamental to the theory and practice of management in general and 
communications management in particular. No one individual or any one 
group has a mastery of organisational problems, as a result of organisations’ 
inbuilt interdependence and complexity. Thus, the search for solutions to 
problems that are multi-causal in nature involves creative input from different 
disciplines, departments and from people of varied managerial rank. Openness 
is therefore critical to organisational learning (Senge, 1990). The data in this 
paper illuminates many of the means by which managers refuse to be open, 
even to themselves, about their organisation’s problems and hence how they 
inhibit the transmission of basic information. Without a willingness to even 
acknowledge the existence of problems, it would seem unlikely they can 
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engage a wider debate with their employees on the search for solutions. Thus, 
the difficulties discussed here are a recipe for chronic organisational decline. 
 
2. Upward feedback, the central issue of our first research question, emerged in 
this study as inadequate, particularly when such feedback is of a critical nature 
This finding is consistent with the observations of Heller (1998), who reported 
on two 12-country studies on industrial democracy and a 5-year longitudinal 
program in seven companies in three countries. The conclusion is that: ‘… 
organizational influence sharing appears to have made only limited progress 
during the last 50 years’ (p.1425). Our study suggests that even the minimal 
influence that comes from being able to articulate different perspectives is 
often lacking. Evidently, those with power hang on to it, while frequently 
lamenting the reluctance of subordinates to exercise more initiative. In this 
study, for example, senior managers complained frequently and bitterly about 
what they referred to as ‘delegation upwards.’ It did not occur to them that 
they needed to relax control mechanisms and develop a less punitive climate, 
in order to ensure that a real culture of empowerment could take root. 
 
3. The study suggests rather more than that upward feedback is hard to come by. 
It is systematically distorted, constrained and eliminated. The issue of 
management responses to critical feedback was a critical element of our 
second research question. We found a strong interaction between employee 
responses to upward communication opportunities and the facilitative/ 
constraining role of management, creating major paradoxes. A number of 
studies have explored how social actors discursively develop organizational 
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identities that are simultaneously constraining and enabling, debilitating and 
empowering (e.g. Collinson, 1988; Trethewey, 1997). Likewise, we see here a 
simultaneous affirmation by senior managers that they want an empowered 
staff to take decisions and feel liberated to transmit upward feedback. This co-
exists alongside the elimination of dissenters from the ranks of the senior 
management team; fear by new members to openly express their critical views 
(which the evidence suggests will either wither, or see the person leave the 
ranks of the group); and a number of management behaviours widely 
perceived as punitive. It has been pointed out that ‘Relinquishing power and 
control does not come easily for many leaders’ (Kirkman and Rosen, 2000, 
p.55). Our study suggests that the first steps in such a direction (e.g. the 
acknowledgement of problems; an open transmission of mildly critical 
information) are frequently never taken. 
 
4. This study also illuminates some of the processes whereby managers explain 
and excuse this situation to themselves, and hence raises issues of irrational 
belief systems. Many irrational beliefs (i.e. unfounded assumptions about the 
nature of the physical and social world) take deep root because people 
construct plausible sounding stories that posit causal relationships between 
what are actually unrelated variables (Dawes, 2001).  
 
In the case of the HCO, a main narrative on the part of the management team 
was the alleged incompetence of the GMs they themselves had recently 
appointed. Without exception, all were deemed to be failing. In line with what 
has been described as the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979), which 
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posits a tendency to over-ascribe the behaviour of others to their personality 
while explaining our own problematic behaviours to the situation in which we 
find ourselves, this was viewed exclusively as a personal failing. The 
possibility that it reflected an inherently impossible job description or 
unsupportive management structure was not considered. The constant 
repetition of this narrative, in both group management sessions and in 
individual interviews with each member of the management team, was 
striking. It suggests a tendency on the part of busy managers to look quickly 
for causal explanations of organisational problems, to construct such 
explanations through the dynamics of story construction rather than empirical 
exploration, to create such narratives with minimal awareness of attribution 
processes (and thus with a strong tendency towards error), and to do so in an 
environment characterised by extraordinarily limited feedback from outsiders. 
This further strengthens the alluring power of a narrative that both explains 
and exonerates the managers themselves from responsibility. We would 
suggest that a blame alignment theory could be posited as shedding further 
light on this dynamic – a possible tendency of people in a failing or difficult 
situation to realign blame in such a manner that it is placed on others rather 
than the self. Such a dynamic may underlie much of the attribution difficulties 
discussed here. It also seems likely that this misdirects management attention 
from the real sources of their problems and so intensify the spiral of crisis. For 
example, managers in this HCO were unwilling to contemplate the possibility 
that their organisational structure created impossible expectations of those in 
the role of GMs; that systems for upward feedback were lacking; that greater 
diversity within the SMT would be helpful. 
 27
5.  The response to the findings of the Communication Audit by senior managers 
suggested a tendency to over-critique negative feedback, while instantly 
agreeing with positive feedback. In reality, unless senior managers adopted an 
equally rigorous approach to both forms of feedback ingratiation theory 
suggests that will inevitably acquire a lop-sided view of their own 
organisation. The consequence is likely to be that the only people surprised by 
critical results from research investigations are a SMT, nominally the people 
best placed to have an overall view of their organisation. 
 
6. The data here also lends empirical support to the claim by Young and Post 
(1993) that in organisations that communicate well or badly the tone is set by 
the CEO. The volume of comments aimed at the behaviour of the CEO 
confirm that organisational actors keenly observe such a person’s behaviour, 
draw many conclusions from it about an organisation’s culture, and use the 
CEO’s behaviour as a strong guide as to which direction they are moving in. 
Beyond this, high expectations are also held of the SMT. The role of senior 
managers critical to setting the tone, and imposes inescapable obligations.  
 
Implications for the practice of communications management 
 
Consistent with the central thrust of this project, recent research into organisations 
deemed to have made the transition from being merely good to the achievement of 
sustained ‘greatness’, has suggested that a culture of confronting the brutal facts is 
essential. As with Nutt’s (1999) research into decision-making, and the work of many 
into group dynamics, the conclusion is clear. Open communication and the frequent 
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upward transmission of critical opinion is a vital ingredient of organisational 
effectiveness (Tourish and Vatcha, 2003; Tourish and Hargie, 2004).. We have 
illuminated many of the barriers that get in the way. Tentatively, among the 
implications for practice, we would identify the following: 
 
• Managers still appear to be largely unaware of groupthink, ingratiation 
processes and the distorting power of self-efficacy biases. At a minimum, 
intense training in these issues by communications professionals would appear 
useful. 
• Managers also need trained in how to facilitate, receive and respond to 
feedback. We have identified, here, the processes whereby positive feedback is 
nodded through by managers, but negative feedback is over critiqued. Again, 
wider awareness of such dynamics would be helpful. 
• Systems for upward feedback need strengthening. In the organisation where 
we conducted our fieldwork, and in many others we have researched, we 
found that even the minimal influencing mechanism of suggestion schemes 
was absent. More advanced approaches, in which senior managers routinely 
monitor the amount of specifically critical feedback that they get, also appear 
to be required. 
• Regular reviews of communication issues should also measure the upward 
transmission of ideas, particularly of those that are critical. To our 
knowledge, the need for upward communication of a specifically critical 
nature is not something that has yet been widely acknowledged in the 
literature. Similarly, its effects have been under-researched. 
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• Those conducting communication assessments need also to consider how 
critical findings can be presented to senior managers. The temptation is to 
downgrade the significance of critical data, and produce findings that may be 
consistent with what senior managers wish was the case but which depart from 
what most people in the organisation actually feel. In this case study, and 
considering our experiences elsewhere, the SMT did have a particular horror 
of what it perceived as negative information, and which made the research 
task harder. Nevertheless, the key appears to be to strike a balance between the 
negative and the positive. We would suggest that part of the answer is to shift 
from the importance of communication assessments in themselves, and place 
more stress on the preparatory work with SMTs, involving a stronger focus on 
their vision, values and communication principles. 
 
Internal communication is indispensable for organisational learning, corporate cohesion 
and the achievement of many business objectives. Its promotion and research into its 
effects needs to become core concerns for communications practitioners and 
researchers. The data in this paper suggests that many of the obstacles to the emergence 
of good internal communication do not arise from external environmental 
considerations, but rather from the approach which many senior managers display 
towards critical feedback. The practical and theoretical challenges posed are 
considerable.  
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TABLE 1: INFORMATION SENT ON IMPORTANT ISSUES  
FACING THE ORGANISATION 
 
KEY FOR SCORING ITEMS: 1=VERY LITTLE; 2=LITTLE 3=SOME; 
 4=GREAT; 5=VERY GREAT 
a, b , and c Denotes all differences between scores which are statistically 
significant, at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.    Ranking based on 
computed difference between mean for information sent and needing to be sent. 
 
 
TOPIC AREA Amount of 
information 
sent 
Amount of 
information 
needing to be 
sent 
Rank 
Public confidence and trust in the service 
 
2.6 3.9 a 1 
Funding for Services 
 
2.5 3.8 a 1 
Service Equity 
 
2.6 3.9 a 1 
Public expectations 
 
2.8 4 a 4 
Service Quality 
 
2.9 4.1 a 4 
Personal responsibility 
 
3.2 4 a 6 
 
MEAN TOTAL 
 
2.8 
 
4.0 a 
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Insert Figure 1 
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Box 1: Respondent comments on information dissemination 
 
‘There is a lack of communication. We don’t know what’s going on. We hear things 
on the grapevine rather than from supervisory staff.’ 
‘I suspect an organisation this size is always on to a loser with internal 
communications. Every week I get constant gripes that communication is inadequate. 
But I don’t think it is significantly worse than anywhere else I have been. There is just 
never enough time to manage it.’ 
‘Communication is not good. Sometimes there is no communication on very major 
things. Major decisions are made without consultation. I don’t blame senior 
managers. They are under pressure from (the Government) to do various things, 
sometimes far too quickly. But for example new appointments were being rapidly 
organised in Area A and no one was asked for their opinion about it. This sort of 
thing does not engender trust.’ 
‘Communication is haphazard. We rely a lot on informal communication.’ 
 ‘There is no formal strategy for communication, no policy document or anything else. 
This could set out a process for everybody. This would assign and clarify roles 
relating to communication. It would help with understanding and clarify for people 
what the role of GMs etc is.’ 
‘Upward feedback is also ad-hoc. There is no system for it.’ 
‘We are definitely not involved in decision making, except to some extent in your own 
area.’ 
‘Communication here is reasonable, approaching adequate.’ 
‘Communication is very poor from management down. I sent about X letters last year 
to senior managers and did not get a reply to any one of them.’ 
‘I don’t see senior managers; they never come near you.’ 
‘In the last 4 years communication has  gone down hill. The organisation is larger 
and more disparate. With big sorts of issues it is only by chance that you hear about 
what is going on. I am often taken by surprise when I find out about important issues.’ 
‘I pick up lots of information informally in the canteen. I would love a leaflet of some 
kind when I started about who’s who – the role of the CEO etc.’ 
‘I wouldn’t recognise X (a senior manager) if he walked into the room.’ 
‘I only came here recently, to a management role. My first impressions are that the 
organization is very technologically based. There are emails everywhere for example, 
instead of face-to-face communication.’ 
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Box 2: Respondent comments on communication from the CEO 
 
 
‘I think I understand the CEO’s vision: he appears to be trying to make things more 
people centred.’  
‘Sometimes directives come from management (e.g. CEO’s office) and they may be 
communicated adequately in that you know what to do, but the rationale behind them 
is not clear. Sometimes this undermines the idea of consultation.’ 
‘I have to concentrate hard to follow what the CEO is going on about, and feel that if 
I get 50% of the drift I am doing well.’ 
‘The CEO has a vision, but he thinks that only he has a vision. His vision is not widely 
understood. He is so verbose. I don’t understand him. He has to pick out clear 
themes.’ 
‘I think that top managers should meet with people at various levels in the acute 
facility. The (top team) do not meet regularly with key people. The CEO is generally 
unavailable to meet with the consultant body.’ 
‘There is a clear vision by the CEO and I share it and can buy into it. What I’m not 
sure is whether it is the product of a collective thinking process. There must be bottom 
up communication, otherwise there will not be buy in and I’m not sure of how much of 
that there is in the HCO.’ 
‘I’d like the CEO to listen. He is so sure of his vision that he does not listen to 
alternatives.’ 
‘The CEO is not good at flattening. Decision-making is far more centralised than ever 
despite the talk. What the CEO does is far different from what he says. There is a 
huge discrepancy. I don’t think the CEO listens. He got very shirty with one of our 
people at a meeting when she raised a minor objection to something he was 
presenting.’ 
‘A lot of communication can emanate from the CEO, but most of it is impenetrable. I 
have no idea most of the time what he is on about. Recently a new structure was 
announced for the hospital. Again this was just presented to us without our input. 
After five minutes my eyes glazed over. I don’t understand it and cannot relate to it. 
There is a huge level of distrust among medical staff. People believe that the CEO has 
no respect for consultants and thinks they are part of the problem. We have the 
perception that the senior management team has very little experience in the acute 
sector. They lack credibility. They don’t understand the sector, they have no feel for 
it.’ 
‘The CEO’s vision seems to make sense if it works. But part of it is this idea that we 
are all one big happy family. The reality is that people on the ground feel they are 
struggling on their own. You only know people in your own immediate area.’ 
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Box 3: Senior management comments in feedback seminar 
 
 
• ‘How representative is this data?’  
• ‘Surely in an organisation this size you would need to survey at least half the 
staff to be sure you really knew what they thought?’ 
• ‘I can’t believe results from anything like this can be accurate unless you survey 
everybody. Otherwise you just get feedback from those with gripes.’  
• ‘Surely communication isn’t any worse here than anywhere else. Can it ever 
really be any better?’ 
• ‘People just like to moan. They’ll do it whatever we do.’ 
• ‘This can’t be accurate – no one has ever made the type of comments to me that 
you have in this Report.’ 
• ‘We cannot possibly publish this sort of stuff, or even circulate it internally – 
what if any of it got into the press?’ 
• ‘Maybe we should just burn this Report and hope no-one else has a copy.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
